What is a Game?, the third chapter of Egenfeldt Nielsen, Heide Smith, and Pajares Tosca’s book is the first chapter to really delve into the theories behind not just video gaming, but games in general. The chapter is dense with information, and it is not co-incidental that it is double the length of the chapters preceding it. The authors preface the chapter with an expression of explicit concern about adhering to a single methodological approach, due to the biases inherent in methodologies which may tend towards overly-specific criteria/focuses.
From this cautionary starting point, the authors offer several potential answers to the question in the chapter’s title. The first examination they provide is Wittgenstein’s contention that there are no common features shared amongst all games, thus a unified definition is impossible, and that the most one can hope for is ‘family resemblances’. The authors critique this view, asserting that Wittgenstein did not try to find the commonalities in games, merely offering a few examples which do not share certain features in order to further his argument. They also point out that Wittgenstein does not differentiate between formal games, such as chess, and informal games, such as ring-around-the-rosy.
The authors then move to Johann Huizinga’s seminal 1938 text, Homo Ludens. As the book was written in ’38, it clearly cannot address video games as a medium, but what it does is offer context for understanding all games, as well as underscoring the importance of play as a cultural phenomenon. Huizinga puts forth the theory of the ‘magic circle’, in which playing a game sets a person apart from outside reality. This setting apart is possible because the game exists as its own separate reality with attendant rules and expectations. The authors criticize the idea of the magic circle by contending that there are several activities in which people submit themselves to special rules and norms which do not apply outside of those specific contexts (their examples include classes/exams, workplaces, and nightlife activities).
The authors also cite Edward Castranova, arguing for the preservation of the magic circle in the face of the loss of fantasy (i.e. real-world encroachment), in order for games to maintain their unique appeal. The problem with Castranova’s argument is that it precludes the idea that real-world encroachment can create or foster different kinds of fantasy, based on real-world influences, and/or alter previously held fantasies, ostensibly for the better.
The authors offer another, extremely strong, counter to Huizinga’s magic circle. They contend that games do, in fact, have real-world consequences, providing the following list as examples:
- Games require time
- Games affect the mood of the player
- Video games are a communication medium [like it or not]
- Games affect behavior/bias decisions [a concept clearly linked to the notion of games as communication medium]
- May directly affect outside world (i.e. economic blurring, such as the real-money auction house in Diablo III)
Because of this list of assertions, the authors conclude that Huizinga’s magic circle is really only useful as a bracketing device to be used by formalists.
The authors then look to Roger Callois, and his 1958 book, Man, Play, and Games. Again, the book is too old to specifically address video games, looking at play as an overarching concept. Callois defines play as voluntary, uncertain, unproductive, and make-believe (a definition which has been called into question by research facilities such as MIT, who have used online gaming as a way of generating collaborative scientific breakthroughs). Callois breaks games down into four categories:
- Agon (competition) e.g. sports
- Alea (chance) e.g. slots; roulette
- Mimicry (imitation) e.g. role-playing
- Ilinx (vertigo) e.g. roller coasters
Callois contends that these four categories may be combined to describe complex forms of games. He also divides the notion of play into two categories: paida, which is freeform and not bound by rigid rules/expectations or win/loss conditions; and ludus, in which rigid rule-sets bind player actions and determine win/loss scenarios.
The authors, in criticizing Callois’ theories, cite prominent video game scholar Jesper Juul and his argument that there is a lack of fluidity in Callois’ categories. Further, Juul rails against the perceived binary of the paida/ludus categories. The authors further argue that, in discussing video games, the players cannot negotiate the rules with the computer, making the perceived divide between ludus and paida evident, despite bleed-over concepts which may be inherent in the game’s design. This last argument is a fallacy, as the authors do not take into account that the options offered in game customization menus are the very rule negotiations which they claim are not possible with a computer arbitrator. Furthermore, the use of cheats and hacks on the part of the player are a negotiation of the rules outside of what the formalized system of the menus would otherwise permit.
The discussion then looks to various other theorists for suitable answers to the chapter’s title, and contrasting the various concepts with one another:
- Marshall McLuhan - games are tied to the cultures in which they exist and relieve tension. The authors dismiss McLuhan’s theory, as he tends to explain away problems with his claim in an off-hand, dismissive, fashion, and because he does not provide any empirical data or proof of his tension relief/catharsis claim. These counters are common arguments against McLuhan’s theories, in general, and are understandably levied here.
- Gregory Bateson - play is meta-communication. Eg, a fighting game is not actually fighting, but instead playing at fighting, which holds different meanings in different contexts. The authors do not take this idea far enough: since different games apply different context-sensitive actions to the generic inputs of the controller buttons, the notion of different contexts holding different meanings is much deeper than the authors choose to explore.
- Brian Sutton-Smith - “an exercise of voluntary control systems in which there is an opposition between forces, confined by a procedure and rules in order to produce a disequilibrial outcome”. He also states that a definition of a game will vary, based on outcome.
- George Herbert Mead - play allows for adoption of new roles and games create an idea of social awareness of others through rules and other players, the former emphasizing the presence of the latter. This idea is problematic when applied to video games, as the majority of video games contain some form of single-player component, removing the presence of others.
- Henry Jenkins - video games are a new art form. He points out that video games face the same criticisms as other media, such as film or comic books, in their infancies. Games are about player control and the experience the player has when he/she perceives that his/her actions have had a profound impact on the game and its world, creating a previously unknown sense of immersion between an art work and the person experiencing it.
After presenting these various theories, the authors discuss how these and other attempts to define games are problematic, because the categories offered are paradoxically too narrow and yet too broad. For example, auctions may fit the concept of ‘game’ (as there are victory conditions, opposition, rigid rules, and the like) but MMORPGs, such as World of Warcraft or Ultima Online, do not meet the criteria set forth (no ending or win/loss scenario, no clear goal which drives the players forward, and so on).
With this notion in mind, the discussion is then focused on finding a formal definition of games, as follows:
- Chris Crawford argues for four fundamental features of video games, offered when he was a video game developer in 1982:
o Representation: games represent a subset of reality, even if it is a highly fantasized version of that subset.
o Interaction: the player must be able to influence the game world and receive feedback on actions performed.
o Conflict: The game has a goal, which is blocked by obstacles.
o Safety: game conflicts do not cause the same consequences as similar conflicts in real-world situations.
- Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman - games are systems which present artificial conflict, defined by rules, which result in a quantifiable outcome.
- Jesper Juul - games are rule-based formal systems with variable, differently valued outcomes; the player feels attached to the outcome by attempts to influence it, and consequences are optional and negotiable.
The authors offer their counter-points to these theories. They argue that Salen and Zimmerman’s definition is far too broad, pointing out that, by their definition, a university exam qualifies as a game. They also contend that Juul’s definition places too much agency on the player’s relationship to the game, arguing that there are players who will not become highly invested or motivated by the game in which they are involved. This contention seems like a bit of a straw-man argument, as without even minimal participation, there can be no game (see Galloway’s contention that, until it is played, a video game is merely inert code).
These attempts to define games and play are not just an intellectual exercise, according to the authors. They argue that attempts at definition help to determine the educational merits of video games, and that these diverse offerings of a definition allow for a perspective on the relation to, and relationship with, other media. Having made these assertions, the authors move on to what they term ‘pragmatic definitions’, definitions by game designers and professionals rather than academics.
The first of these definitions on offer is Sid Meier’s statement that ‘a game is a series of interesting choices’ (pg 37). The authors take issue with Meier’s definition, however. They claim that the definition applies best to the types of strategy games that Meier is most fond of making, and that there are not ‘interesting choices’ to be had in games such as Blade Runner and Super Mario Bros., as they rely more on finding the correct solution to a puzzle and testing reflex and reaction, respectively. This counter-argument, however, makes the assumption that the interesting choices in question are solely the province of the player. It is also entirely possible that these choices may be made by the designers or the computer system, itself. Using their own example, Blade Runner features a randomly generated story based on a database of set-pieces, which the game system then chooses and strings together.
The next pragmatic definition is from Robin Hunicke, Marc LeBlanc, and Robert Zubeck. Their definition is described as the “Mechanics-Dynamics-Aesthetics” model, and is as follows:
- Mechanics: the algorithmic rules of the game system.
- Dynamics: the way the game actually plays, based on the mechanics. This aspect includes all possible and unpredictable scenarios.
- Aesthetics: favourable emotional responses invoked in the player as game interaction occurs.
Further, Hunicke, LeBlanc, and Zubeck suggest that there are eight elements which are attractive aspects of games. These elements are:
- Sensation (game as sense-pleasure)
- Fantasy (game as make-believe)
- Narrative (game as drama)
- Challenge (game as obstacle course)
- Fellowship (game as social framework)
- Discovery (game as uncharted territory)
- Expression (game as self-discovery)
- Submission (game as pastime)
The authors point out that Hunicke, LeBlanc, and Zubeck’s concepts have subjective interpretations, and vary based on the game in question and the person experiencing it. They also point out that several categories may apply at the same time.
The authors feel that, while useful, Hunicke, LeBlanc, and Zubeck’s model has limitations. For one, it does not discuss how gameplay works: concepts like play context, framing culture, and links to other media are completely ignored. Further, it is also argued that the model ignores the expressive side of games. This statement seems odd, given the proffered categories related to expression in the definition. Further, the authors simply make this statement without any elaboration or presentation of proof, the very thing for which they criticized McLuhan.
The chapter then takes an odd turn, veering away from the definition of games to a discussion of genre distinctions. They offer the following systems of genre categorization:
- Mark J.P. Wolf – interactivity (goals set for the player) is the best way of assigning genre, rather than what is shown on screen. He offers 43 different genres, which the authors feel have no discernable system of categorization. It is also clear that his system privileges only one aspect of the game experience (interactivity) over all others.
- Espen Aarseth – categorization based on a series of variables rather than single aspects, such as theme/themic action. The authors contend, and I agree, that this system has limited practical use. The system seems to offer each individual game its own distinct genre, which does nothing to solve the problem.
- Egenfeldt Nielsen, Heide Smith, Pajares Tosca – success-criteria based genre classification. While they do recognize the problem inherent in the system in terms of classifying single-player and multiplayer RPGs, they do not recognize how their system is similar to Wolf’s, and just as easily abused.
The authors conclude by offering their four genre categories: action games (motor skill/hand-eye co-ordination); adventure games (deep thinking and deduction); strategy games (role of General coordinating autonomous fighters); and process-oriented games (offers system to play with, rather than specific goals to achieve).
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